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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion to set aside
a default judgment (R-82) entered by the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, judge of the
Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, Salt Lake Department
(default judgment was entered as a result of defendant's failure to appear for the
trial).

Judge Gibson specifically ruled that defendant had failed to use due

diligence prior to the trial and that there was no excusable neglect which would
excuse him from appearing at the time and place set for the trial.
Jurisdiction is based on Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals (hereinafter referred to as R.U.C.A.) and on 78-4-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

ii

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
(a) WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE DEFENDANT
INEXCUSABLY FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE TRIAL.
(b) WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHOUT TAKING TESTIMONY FROM
THE PLAINTIFF.
RULES
Rules 55 and 60 are set out in full in the Addendum.

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition below.

This

action was commenced October 27, 1986, by service of summons upon the
defendant (R-5), and involves a dispute over services as a private detective
allegedly rendered by the defendant for the plaintiff as set forth in plaintiff's
complaint (R 1-2).
Defendant answered the complaint pro se (R 7-8), responded initially to
plaintiff's discovery pro se (R 24-30), and ultimately responded with assistance of
counsel (R 40-45). Counsel then withdrew (R 48). Plaintiff notified defendant to
appoint counsel (R 49), and defendant proceeded thereafter pro se. Notice of trial
was mailed to the defendant November 20, 1986, by the clerk of the court (R 51),
noticing the trial for 9:30 a.m., January 5, 1987.
The case was called for trial by the Court on January 5, shortly after
9:30 a.m.

No one appeared for the defendant.

The undersigned appeared as

attorney for the plaintiff, advised the Court that he had no witnesses, moved the
Court for an order striking the answer of the defendant, entering his default, and
entering judgment against the defendant pursuant to the prayer of the complaint.
Judge Gibson took the motion under advisement and requested counsel to submit
some authority for the proposition that he could enter default judgment without
proof from the plaintiff where the defendant had answered and the case was at
issue at the time of trial (R 52-53, 64, 73-74).
Plaintiff filed the requested memorandum January 26, 1987, with Judge
Gibson (R 52-54), discussed the contents thereof with the Court, and the Court
thereupon entered default judgment as prayed (R 60-61).
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Defendant, thereafter

made timely motion to vacate the default

judgment (R 62-63), supported by his affidavit (R 65-66). The undersigned filed an
affidavit in opposition (R 73-75), and the motion was argued March 18 (R 82). It
was denied upon the ground that defendant had failed to exercise due diligence
prior to the trial, and that there was no excusable neglect that would excuse him
from attending the trial (R 82). Defendant filed his notice of appeal March 19 (R
84), 12 days before entry of the order appealed from on March 31 (R 82).
Statement of Additional Facts. In addition to the facts set forth in the
foregoing discussion of the nature, course and disposition of the case, the following
facts are significant:
1. All pleadings filed by the defendant prior to the appearance of
Randy Ludlow as his counsel, listed his address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84118 (R 7, 24, 26). The summons was served upon him at that
address (R 6) and the complaint mailed to him at that address (R 2).
2. Discovery, notices and correspondence mailed by the undersigned
were directed to defendant at 5564 West Jeremiah Drive (R 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20,
23, 33, 34 and 36).
3.

A supplemental order was served upon defendant at that address (R

47), as was the notice to appoint counsel (R 49) and the request for trial setting (R
50). There is nothing in the file to indicate that any of them were not received by
the defendant.
4. Notice of Trial was sent to the defendant at the said address giving
him just over six weeks advance notice.
5. Defendant's pro se motion to set aside the default judgment, once
again, listed his address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive.
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6. Except for the unsworn representations in defendant's motion to
vacate the default judgment (R 62), the only thing in the record purporting to
excuse the defendant from appearing at the trial is the statement contained as
paragraph 3 of the affidavit of M. Chris Harrison (R 65-66) which states: "That the
notice of trial in the above entitled matter was inadequate, and that defendant
received said notice by telephone from his daughter".
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
All pleadings in the file, either those sent by the plaintiff or those
received from the defendant, list defendant's address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive,
Salt Lake City, Utah. Since defendant himself supplied the address, it is presumed
to be the address to which notice should be sent until such time as defendant
notifies the court and counsel to the contrary.
Notice of the trial was mailed to defendant at the Jeremiah Drive
address, by the clerk of the court over six weeks prior to the time scheduled for
trial.

Defendant received that notice and also was additionally notified by his

daughter at some unspecified time.
Defendant failed to show due diligence and/or that he was prevented
from appearing at the trial by circumstances over which he had no control.
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in
granting or denying a motion to vacate, and will be reversed by the Appellate
Court only where an abuse of discretion is clearly established.
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that even the clerk of
the court may enter a default judgment for a sum certain (as in this case), once the
default of the defendant has been entered.

The court entered the defendant's

default when he failed to appear for trial. Plaintiff applied to the court, and the
court, as it is permitted to do by Rule 55, determined that it was not necessary to
take testimony on the sum certain before entering judgment by default.
3

The appeal of the plaintiff is frivolous and plaintiff should be awarded
double costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 R.U.C.A.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE DEFENDANT
INEXCUSABLY FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE TRIAL
Applicable facts.

Without restating the facts in detail, the following

series of facts and events are controlling:

(a) Summons was served on the

defendant at 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the complaint
was mailed to him at that address, (b) Defendant answered the complaint, pro se,
and listed his address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, (c) Discovery was mailed to
him at the Jeremiah Drive address and he responded, pro se, listing, once again, his
address as the Jeremiah Drive address,

(d) The only address on any of the

pleadings filed by defendant (except for those filed by his attorney) list 5564 West
Jeremiah Drive as his address, (e) There is nothing in the record to support the
contention made by the defendant in his brief that his daughter is a teenager, or
that he only received notice of the trial from her by telephone on the day of the
trial,

(f) To the contrary, all indications are that he actually received all

pleadings and correspondence in a timely manner• For instance, the complaint was
mailed to him October 30, 1984, and he filed his answer only 14 days later on
November 13. (g) The notice of trial was mailed to defendant at the Jeremiah
Drive address November 20, 1986, giving him just over six weeks advance notice.
(h) The only thing in the record purporting to excuse defendant from appearing at
the trial is the statement contained in his affidavit (paragraph 3) wherein he states
"that a notice of trial in the above entitled matter was inadequate, and that the
defendant received said notice by telephone from his daugher". Note that nothing
4

is said about when he received either the written notice or the telephone call from
his daughter.
Due diligence and excusable neglect.

While it is true, as stated in

defendant's brief that ". . . it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set
it aside", Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U.2d. 52, 376 P.2d. 951 (1962), and
that the remedy should be liberally administered in order to grant the defaulting
party his day in court, Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d. 741
(1953), it is likewise beyond dispute that such policy coexists with the broad
latitude of discretion accorded the trial court in ruling upon such motions. See
Warren vs. Dixon Ranch (supra), and Board of Education of Granite School District
vs. Cox, 14 U.2d. 385, 384 P.2d. 806 (1963). In fact, the implementation of the
policy has been specifically committed to the trial court as follows:
"The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a party from a
final judment under Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and this court will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of
discretion is clearly established . . . the rule that the courts will
incline toward granting relief to a party, who has not had the
opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial
court level, and this court will not reverse the determination of
the trial court merely because the motion could have been
granted." Airkem Intermountain Inc. vs. Parker, 30 U.2d. 65, 513
P.2d. 429 (1973), emphasis added.
Justice Hall, in his vigorous dissent in the matter of Interstate
Excavating, Inc., vs. Agla Development Corporation, 611 P.2d. 369 (1980), observed
that such discretion accorded the trial court has been given the "widest berth" by
reviewing courts relative to motions to vacate judgments which are based on
allegations of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect. He reminds us that a
determination at the trial court level that a given course of conduct did not
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constitute mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect sufficient to justify relief
from a default judgment will, therefor, be disturbed on appeal "only in the presence
of a manifest abuse of discretion". See 611 P.2d. at 372. He further reminds us
that excusable neglect must occur despite the exercise of due diligence, that it
must have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances, that simple carelessness will not qualify, nor will simple business difficulties which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate attention to the
litigation in question.
The case of Heath vs. Mower, 597 P.2d. 855 (1979) seems to say it all.
In that case, defendant failed to respond to the complaint and his default was
entered. Upon motion it was vacated and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to
which defendant responded. Notice of pre-trial was sent to defendant at various
known addresses. Defendant did not show up for the pre-trial, but allegedly sent a
mailgram to the court stating that he would be unable to attend, was looking for a
local attorney to handle the matter, and asked how he should proceed from that
point on. The mailgram did not arrive at the clerk's office until 4 days after the
pre-trial hearing.

At the hearing, the Court entered defendant's default and

entered judgment pursuant to the prayer of the complaint.
Thereafter he obtained the services of an attorney who promptly moved
to vacate the judgment. Accompanying the motion was Mower's affidavit stating,
among other things, that he had never received the certified notice mailed by
plaintiffs counsel (and which he had refused to claim).

He pointedly made no

mention of the notice mailed by the clerk of the court and claimed that he had
"become aware" of the pre-trial hearing, 2 days before it was scheduled, through a
telephone conversation with his wife (a co-defendant). The trial court denied the
motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Mower knew about the pre-
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trial date and that he had received timely notice. Mower claimed that he had been
given insufficient notice of the pre-trial hearing (does that remind one of anything
alleged by the defendant in the instant case?) and cited several cases standing for
the proposition that the court should favor granting relief from a default judgment
whenever there is reasonable excuse and it would not result in substantial prejudice
or injustice to the adverse party. Justice Stewart, writing the unanimous decision
said:
"While we agree that trial courts should be generally indulgent
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they
can be settled advisedly and in conformity with law and justice
(citing Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., supra), each case must,
nevertheless, depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. fNo general rule can be laid down respecting the
discretion to be exercised in setting aside or refusing to set aside a
judgment by default.1 " Page 858.
Justice Stewart went on to say:
"The rule that the courts will incline towards granting relief to
a party who has not had the opportunity to present his case, is
ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and this court will not
reverse the determination of the trial court merely because the
motion could have been granted." Emphasis added.
Referring to Airkem Intermountain, Inc. vs. Parker, 30 U.2d. at 68, 513 P.2d. at
431, he said:
" . . . a party trying to set aside a default judgment 'must show
that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.1 "
See also Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, also stating that movant
must have exercised due diligence.
Application to defendant. Movant's only excuse for failing to appear at
the trial was that the notice was allegedly "inadequate" and that he received notice
by telephone from his daughter.

Nothing is said about why the notice was

inadequate, nor what effect notice from his daughter purportedly had. There is a

7

complete dearth of information concerning due diligence of the defendant prior to
the trial, why he could not attend at the appointed time, what efforts he made to
notify the court or counsel of any change of address or to assure that he would get
notices in the future, when he received the notice in the mail, when he received
the telephone call from his daughter, where he was at the time, what efforts he
made to notify the court or counsel that he would be late or could not attend, and
etc.

Is it any wonder that the trial judge concluded that defendant had not

exercised due diligence prior to the trial and that there was no excusable neglect
excusing him from appearing at the trial? There is no manifest abuse of discretion
shown and the decision of the trial court should be upheld.
POINT II
THE CIRCUIT COURT ACTED PROPERLY BY GRANTING
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHOUT TAKING TESTIMONY
FROM THE PLAINTIFF
Applicable facts.

The case was called for trial by the court shortly

after 9:30 on the 5th of January, 1987.

No one appeared on behalf of the

defendant. The undersigned appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, advised the court
that he did not have any witnesses present and moved the court for an order
striking the answer of the defendant, entering his default, and entering judgment
against the defendant pursuant to the prayer of the complaint. The Court took the
matter under advisement and requested counsel to submit some authority for the
proposition that he could enter default judgment without proof by the plaintiff
where the defendant had answered and case was at issue.

The requested

memorandum was submitted to the court on January 26 and judgment entered
accordingly. See above statement of the case for citations to the record.
Post Hearing Contacts with Court.

Defendant attempts to make

something improper out of the submission of the memorandum and discussion with
8

the Court (as requested by the Court) without further notice to him (the defendant)
who was in default.

The memorandum and discussion with the Court was, in

reality, a continuation of the discussion had between counsel and the court on the
5th at the time of trial.

It is clear that there was no obligation, nor even

expectation, of counsel or the Court to notify defendant thereof.

Rule 55(a)(2),

U.R.C.P. provides that after the entry of default, there is no need to notify
defendant of any other action to be taken, nor to serve any notice or pleading on
him thereafter, except pleadings asserting new or different matters, and notice of
entry of judgment (which was done in this case).
Effect of Rule 55.

Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules . . . the clerk shall
enter his default."

(Emphasis added). Although defendant did plead, he has not

"otherwise defended" by virtue of his failure to appear for the trial. The writer
was not able to find any Utah cases directly on point. The Supreme Court of the
State of Montana, however, has spoken clearly on this issue. In the case of Archer
vs. LaMarch Creek Ranch (1977), 571 P.2d. 379, the defendant had denied the
allegations of the complaint and had raised certain affirmative defenses in his
answer. He failed to appear at the trial, however, and the plaintiff moved the
court for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered default
judgment against the defendant, who subsequently appealed, on the ground (among
others) that the trial court could not enter judgment upon motion of the plaintiff
where no proof was offered to contravert the allegations of the answer (including
the affirmative defenses).

The Supreme Court, citing Rule 55 of the Montana

Rules of Civil Procedure said that since no one appeared on behalf of the defendant
at the trial, the defendant had thereby failed to "otherwise defend" and "the
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District Court had no alternative but to grant plaintiff's motion for default
judgment". Emphasis added. See page 382.
The earliest reported case that the undersigned was able to find in
support of the proposition that the Court should enter default judgment against the
defendant when he fails to appear at the trial was a reference to a Kentucky case,
Schooler vs. Asherst, 11 Ky (1 Litt) 216.
There is nothing in Rule 55 which requires the Court to take testimony,
particularly where the amount sought is for a sum certain, as in this case.
According to the Rule, once the default had been entered (by the Court), even the
Clerk of the Court could enter the judgment for the pleaded sum certain. The Rule
provides that judgment may be entered as follows:
"(1) By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
computation be made certain, . . . the clerk upon request of the
plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs
against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to
appear . . .
"(2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order
to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper." Emphasis added.
It is apparent that the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain, that even
the Clerk could have entered the judgment after the Court had entered the default,
that plaintiff did, in fact, apply to the Court for judgment, and that the Court did
not deem it necessary for the plaintiff to present evidence on the balance due, or
otherwise. All of which procedure is clearly within the scope of the spirit and the
letter of Rule 55.

10

CONCLUSION
Defendant clearly failed to establish that he had used due diligence and
that he should be excused for failure to appear at the trial due to circumstances
over which he had no control. Notice of the trial was sent to him (at the address
which he had provided the court) over six weeks prior to the time set for trial. He
makes no claim that he did not receive it, but attempts to excuse himself on the
ground that his daughter (also?) notified him by telephone at some unstated time
and without any explanation as to why, in fact, he could not attend the trial at the
designated time.
Neither Rule 55 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, nor any other Rule,
prohibits the entry of default judgment, without evidence, where the amount
claimed is for a sum certain, as was the claim in the instant case. Even so, the
court may enter default judgment upon application of the plaintiff and may take
testimony if it deems it necessary. Obviously it was not necessary in this case.
Plaintiff urges this Court to uphold the decision of the trial court and
sustain the entry of judgment by default.
Plaintiff further requests that the Court make a determination under
Rule 33 R.U.C.A., that the appeal of the defendant is frivolous and/or for the
purpose of delay, and award double costs, including a reasonable attorney fee to
plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July, 1987.

/ * /

Robert L. Lord
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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ADDENDUM
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Rule 55. Default
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his
default
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the
nondefaultmg party
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is
not an infant or incompetent person
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor If, in older to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff,
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule
54(c)
(e) J u d g m e n t against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the State of Utah or against an
officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

Addendum " A "

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes* Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
<4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendanthas
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enterlain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.

Addendum " B "

Circuit Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE D E P A R T M E N T

MICHAEL WILLIAMS
NOTICE OF TRIAL
84 CV 10295

PASBMH

Plantiff(s)
JUDGE

VS.

GIBSON

M. CHRIS HARRISON

Defendant(s)

TO

R o b e r t L.

TO

M. C h r i s

Lord

ATTORNEY FOR

Harrison

. PLANTIFF
Pro-Se

.DEFENDANT

You and each of you will please take notice that the above entitled case is set for
trial in said court at

9 : 5

°

A

o'clock

- M., on the

5th

day of

January

119

J£7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that 1 mailed a copy of the above notice of trial on this

20th

day of

November

R o b e r t L. Lord

M. C h r i s H a r r i s o n

A t t o r n e y a t Law

5564 W. J e r e m i a h

431 S o u t h 500 E a s t ,
S a l t Lake C i t y . Utah

Suite

444

119.86.;

to:

Drive

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

84118

84111

PAUL L. VANCE
CLERK, CIRCUIT COURT

!**«? *

By:

Addendum n C •

*> "* *\vk

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT - SLC.

WEDNESDAY

7, 1937
9:48 AM
Filing Date: 11/01/84

Case
: 845102950 CV Civil
Case Title:
WILLIAMS MICHAEL VS HARRISON M CHRIS

JANUARY

Cause of Action:
Amount of Suit.:
Return Date,...:
Judgment
:
Disposition..••:

$. 00

Court Set: TRIAL

Date:
Date:

Amt:

$. 00

on 01/05/87 at 0930 A in room ? with RCG

No Tracking Activity,
No Accounts Payable Activity.

Party..: PLA Plaintiff
Name...:
WILLIAMS MICHAEL
Home Phone.: ( )

Work Phone.: (

)

Party..: DEF Defendant
Name... :
HARRISON M CHRIS
Home Phone.: (
)

Work Phone.: (

)

J2/25/86 Case converted from SLC system... Civil file date 11/01/84.
SLC
I 10/17/86 FILED NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (DEFENDANT)
MRS
I 10/27/86 FILED NOTICE TO APPEAR IN PERSON OR APPOINT OTHER COUNSEL
MRS
I 11/05/86 FILED REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING
NMD
11/18/86 TRL
scheduled for 1/ 5/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG
NMD
01/05/87 GIBSON/CKO T870002 C44 PLAINTIFF PRESENT THRU ATTY ROBERT LORD. CKO
DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT. PLAINTIFF NOT PREPARED WITH EVIDENCE.
CKO
I
PLAINTIFFS ATTY MOTION FOR JUDGMENT C/0 MOTION DENIED
CKO
End of the docket report for this case.
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ROBERT L. LORD
Utah State Bar No- 1994
Attorney for Plaintiff
444 Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-4241
m THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNT* OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

)
. . . Plaintiff,

vs.
M. CHRIS HARRISON,

)

JUDGMENTBY DEFAULT

)

Civil No. 84-CV-10295

)
• . . Defendant.

)

—oooOooo—
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the
undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court, on the 5th day of
January, 1987, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff appeared by and through his
attorney, Robert L. Lord. No one appeared on behalf of the defendant, whereupon
counsel for the plaintiff moved for judgment pursuant to the prayer of the
complaint on file herein.
The Court, having considered the motion of the plaintiff, together with
the memorandum in support thereof, having examined the files and records herein,
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby finds that the
plaintiff is entitled to a return of the $2,100 advance fees paid to the defendant for
failure of the defendant to provide services as agreed.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises
aforesaid, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said plaintiff do
have and recover from the defendant, the sum of $2,100, interest thereon at the
rate of 10% per annum from December 15, 1983, in the sum of $647.50, together
with plaintiff's costs and disbursement incurred in this action amounting to the sum

37-J22W/J
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of $30.00, making a total judgment of $2,777.50, all to bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from the date hereof till paid.
DATED this <?/, day of January 1987.
BY THE COU1

RoberVaudibson
Circuit Court Judge
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M. CHRTS HARRISON
Pro Se
5564 West Jeremiah Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone? (801) 482-4151

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
/' MOTION T0 SET
Sr*STI^T)EFAULT
, AND
HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.
M. CHRIS HARRISON,

•10295
Defendant.

COMES NOW t h e D e f e n d a n t ,
and

moves

Judgment

this

f o r an O r d e r

Default

e n t e r e d by t h i s C o u r t i n f a v o r of t h e P l a i n t i f f

Michael

b a s e d ^ on t h e f o l l o w i n q

Plaintiff's

Complaint

Plaintiff's

claim.

setting

facts.

was on f i l e ,

aside

That

raising

t h e Answer

valid

defenses

Defendant

appear

in Court,

advised
the
of

that

Court
which

Addendum

was o u t o f town and i m m e d i a t e l y
b u t when D e f e n d a n t

Court

clerk,

Fn

arrived

had been a d j o u r n e d .

and was t o l d ,

is attached,

n

to
to

T h a t N o t i c e of T r i a l was i n a d e q u a t e and t h a t

D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t r e c e i v e n o t i c e u n t i l t h e day of t r i a l ,
time

Pro Se,

the

Williams,

Court

M. C h r i s H a r r i s o n ,

that

a t which

came b a c k

to

to Court,

he was

The D e f e n d a n t

checked

a s shown by m i n u t e e n t r y , a copy

t h e m a t t e r had been c o n t i n u e d

since

Plaintiff

was n o t

present

and P l a i n t i f f ' s

a t t o r n e y was n o t

prepared.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 1987.

p^r^r^
M. CHRIS HARRTSON, PRO SE
NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROBERT
L. LORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing on Defendant's Motion
to Pet Aside Default Judgment has been scheduled to be heard
before one of the Law and Motion Judges of the above entitled
Court on the 10th day of February, 1987 at the hour of 2:00 P.M.
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
Please qovern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this "3rd day of February, 1987.

I. CHRIS HARRISON, PRO SE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ird day of February,
1987, T hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Notice of Hearing, to
Robert L. Lord, attorney for Plaintiff, 444 Metropolitan Law
Building, 411 South 100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

^17^-
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M. CHRIS HARRISON
Pro Se
556 4 West Jeremiah Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone: (ROD 482-4151

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
\

•

••«

'•

III

'

•

'

•

1

'•

'

•

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

•'

111

•

-!•

'

•

j)1'

'

•

]
:

Plaintiff,

i
I

AFFIDAVIT OF
M. CHRIS HARRISON

vs.
/

M. CHRIS HARRISON,

)

)

Defendant.

CIVIL

i

.

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

/

.

.

NO. 84-CV-10295

/

•

•

•

•

•

•

I

T

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

COMES NOW the A f f i a n t , M. Chris Harrison, Pro Se, a f t e r
f i r s t being duly sworn under oath s t a t e s as f o l l o w s :
1.

That A f f i a n t

i s a r e s i d e n t of S a l t Lake County,

State of Utah.
2.

That t h e Answer t o P l a i n t i f f ' s

a b o v e - e n t i t l e d matter,
Plaintiff's

Complaint in the

i s on f i l e r a i s i n g v a l i d d e f e n s e s

to

claim.

3.

That a Notice of Trial in the above e n t i t l e d matter

was i n a d e q u a t e ,

and t h a t Defendant r e c e i v e d s a i d n o t i c e by

telephone from h i s daughter.
4.
trial,

That A f f i a n t

appeared in Court at t h e time of

but he was advised by the clerk that no action was taken,

and that said Trial would be rescheduled.
Addendum n G *

5.

That Affiant checked with the clerk and found t h a t

the P l a i n t i f f

and h i s a t t o r n e y were not prepared to p r e s e n t

evidence a t the time of t r i a l , as shown in minute e n t r y r copy
of which is attached to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
DATED t h i s ^rd day of February, 1987.

TVfis$£M. CHRIS HARRISON, PRO SE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o
1987.

February,

before

NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING AT
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

<*ML.
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n

me t h i s

3rd day

of

ROBERT L. LORD
Utah State Bar No. 1994
Attorney for Plaintiff
Wf Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-4241
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
. . . Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Civil No. 84-CV-10295

M. CHRIS HARRISON,
. . . Defendant.
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
ROBERT L. LORD, being first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and
says that:
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiff in the above entitled matter and
have personal knowlege of all matters alleged herein, except for those matters
alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be
true.
2. Under date of November 20, 1986, the clerk of the court mailed a
copy of the notice of trial to the defendant, M. Chris Harrison, at his address of
5564 West Jeremiah Drive (the address of the defendant as contained on all
pleadings in the file).
3. On January 5, 1987, at the appointed time and place, I appeared on
behalf of the plaintiff. The case was called by the Honorable Robert C. Gibson.
No one appeared for the defendant. I then moved for default judgment based upon
the failure of the defendant to appear for the trial.

37-FWH-a
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4. The Court denied the motion at that time and took it under
advisement, pending citation by plaintiff of authority to grant the judgment under
the circumstances.
5. On January 26, 1987, I presented to the Court a memorandum in
support of my motion, together with a proposed default judgment.
6. After discussing the matter with me, the Court concluded that he
would sign the judgment, which was duly entered of record by the clerk of the
court.
7. Under date of January 29, 1987, I mailed a copy of the notice of
judgment to the defendant at the aforesaid address on Jeremiah Drive.
8. On February 2, 1987, I received a telephone call from an individual
who identified himself as M. Chris Harrison. He told me that he was late for the
trial on January 5, having been delayed coming from out of town. He said he had
just received my notice of judgment and told me that he was not notifed of any
hearing on the 26th. I explained to him that there was no hearing on the 26th, but
that that was the date upon which the judge actually signed the judgment.

He

insisted that I could not take judgment as I had done, and that I needed to present
evidence.
9. I have spent a total of 2.8 hours for appearance at the trial,
research and preparation of the memorandum and preparation of this affidavit. My
customary and reasonable charge for matters of this nature, and the amount agreed
upon between me and the plaintiff, is the sum of $75.00 per hour, making a total
fee incurred by my client (from and including the appearance for trial of this
matter) of $210.00.

^^^

-Robert U Lord
Attorney for Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me this date of February 4, 1987.

NOTARY PUBT3C
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:

lt//7/*7
2
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ROBERT L. LORD
Utah State Bar No. 1994
Attorney for Plaintiff
444 Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-4241
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

)
•

. . Plaintiff,

vs.
M. CHRIS HARRISON,
•

. . Defendant.

)

ORDER/DENYING
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT OUDGMENT

)

Ctfil No. 84-CV-10295

)

)

—oooOooo—
The defendant's motion to set aside default judgment came on regularly
for hearing before the undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court,
on the 18th day of March, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Robert
L. Lord, Defendant was present in court and represented by his attorney, L. Zane
Gill.
The Court, having reviewed the files and records herein, having weighed
and considered the affidavits submitted in support and opposition to the motion
together with the representations and arguments of counsel, finding that the
defendant had failed to use due diligence prior to the trial, and that there was no
excusable neglect excusing him for failing to appear for the trial, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant's motion be, and the same hereby is, denied.
DATED t h i s $ > / day of March 1987.
BY THE COURT:

iibsonCircuit Court Judge
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L. ZANE GILL (3716), of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Defendant
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephones (801) 328-1666
IN TOE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

)

Plaint iff/Respondent,
v.
M. CHRIS HARRISON,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
NOTICE OP APPEAL
) TO CTEAH COURT OP APPEALS
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 84-CV-10295
Judge Gibson

Notice is hereby given that M. Chris Harrison, Defendant abovenamed, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Default
Judgment entered on or about January 26, 1987, in the amount of two
thousand, one hundred dollars ($2,100.00) in favor of Midiael Williams,
Plaintiff and Respondent, against M. Chris harrison, Defendant and Appellant.
This Notice of Appeal is given pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(c) and Rule 3a of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this W

day of March, 1987.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

L. Zane Gill
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I herebycertify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent, this ^/6 day of July, 1986, to L. Zane Gill, attorney for defendant,
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH, 50 West Broadway, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101.

RobCTt L. Lord

